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Aliens Under The Federal Venue Statute
The United States is committed to providing its citizens and aliens with equal
protection of the law and equal access to its judicial tribunals. But the federal
venue provision' significantly discriminates against aliens by denying them the
protection of venue laws; it subjects aliens to the possibility of defending suits
wherever they can be found in the United States. 2 Traditionally, federal venue
laws have been based on citizenship, inhabitance and residence. 3 There is a long-
standing presumption in the United States that an alien does not reside in any
district.4 Therefore, venue of a suit against an alien may lie in any district where
the alien is subject to service of process. 5
Prior to 1887, discrimination against aliens was not significant, because gen-
eral venue provisions allowed all civil suits to be brought in any district where the
defendant was "an inhabitant, or in which he [could] be found." 6 Discrimination
against aliens, under venue laws, began in 1875 when a significant expansion of
federal jurisdiction necessitated the "narrowing of" the venue statute so that peo-
ple would not be inconvenienced by having to defend suits anywhere they could
be found. In 1887, Congress deleted the language "where he shall be found" from
the venue statute and provided that:
No civil suits shall be brought in any district court against anyperson by
any original process or proceeding in any other district than that where-
of he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the
fact that the action is between citizens of different states suits shall
be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or
the defendant. 7
Except for the deletion of the language "where he shall be found," the statute re-
mained the same as it was written in the 1875 revision of the Judiciary Act. 8
Although Congress did not specifically mention venue in suits against aliens in
the 1875 revision of the Judiciary Act, it substituted the phrase "suits against any
person" for "suits against inhabitants of the United States" in describing the suits
subject to the limitation of the venue provisions.9 This was a clear indication of
Congress to extend the protection of the venue provisions to aliens. However,
when the Supreme Court, in 1893, was faced with reconciling this statute with
the long-standing presumption of the nonresidence of aliens, 10 the Court failed
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1948).
2. In Re Hehorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893); Brunette Machine Works Ltd. v. Kockum Industries Inc.,
406 U.S. 706 (1972).
3. Act of September 24, 1789, Ch. 20, Section I1, I Stat. 73, 79; Act of March 3, 1875, Ch. 137,
Section 1, 18 Stat. 470.
4. Se cases cited in note 2 supra.
5. Id.
6. Act of September 24, 1789, Ch. 20, Section II, I Stat. 73, 79.
7. Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552 as corrected by the Act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433
(emphasis added).
8. Act of March 3, 1875, Ch. 137, Section I, 18 Stat. 470.
9. Id.
10. In Re Hehorst, 150 U.S. 653 (1893).
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to recognize the significance of the change in language. If a presumption of non-
residence was valid, then the Court would have been correct in stating that "[t]o
construe the provisions as applicable to allsuits between a citizen and an alien
would leave the courts of the United States open to aliens against citizens and
close them to citizens against aliens."' I The Court however, failed to examine
the validity of the presumption and determined that the change in language was
not substantive. The Court held that Congress did not thereby bring suits against
aliens within the scope of the venue laws. 12
In re Hehorst has been repeatedly reaffirmed without examination of the
presumption of the nonresidence of aliens. 13 Two years after In re HehorsI, ,4 and
despite the discrimination against aliens inherent in the principle announced
there, the same Court declared that a foreign judgment would be recognized in
the United States only if the judgment was rendered under a system of jurispru-
dence likely to insure an impartial administration of justice between the citizens
of its own country and those of other countries. 15
In 1948, Congress gave statutory recognition to In re Hehorst and the pre-
sumption of the nonresidence of aliens, by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (d), which
reads: "An alien may be sued in any district." In contrast, the same venue provi-
sion provides that a civil action against a citizen, based on diversity of citizen-
ship, may be brought "only in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all
defendants reside, or in which the claim arose."' 6 Where the action is not based
solely on diversity of citizenship, it may be brought "only in the judicial district
where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose."' 7 Therefore, an alien
may never sue a citizen in a district where he has, for all practical purposes,
established a residence unless it also happens to be the place where all defendants
reside or the clain arose; an alien may be sued wherever he can be served with a
valid process. 18
Thus, the possibility of discrimination arises when an alien is served with
process while temporarily in a state other than the state in which he actually
resides, and a federal action has been filed in that state. since an alien may be
sued in any district, 19 venue may properly lie in a district court in New Mexico
against an alien resident of Maine. If the alien is sued in New Mexico, he may be
compelled to defend the suit in that state or face a default judgment. A citizen
however, is protected by the venue provision; 20 venue will not lie in any district
other than the district where he resides or where the claim arose. 21
I1. Id. at 660.
12. Id.
13. Keating v. Penn Co., 245 F. 155 (6th Cir. 1917); Brunette Machine Works Ltd. v. Kockum
Ind. Inc., 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
14. 150 U.S. 653 (1893).
15. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1948).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1948).
18. See Brunette Machine Works Ltd. v. Kockum Ind. Inc., 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1948).
20. See note 16supra.
21. Id.
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Some relief is provided by the change of venue provision, which states: "For
the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest ofjustice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought." 22 The controversy over the weight to be attached to different
factors in determining whether to order a transfer in a particular case has given
rise to a veritable flood of litigation.23 "Probably no issue of civil procedure gives
rise to so many reported decisions, year after year, as does this seemingly simple
statute." 24 Even if the alien is ultimately successful in transferring the suit to
another district, in order to seek the transfer he is compelled to answer the suit
initially in the district where it was originally filed. Additionally, since the suit
must be transferred, if at all, to a district or division "where it might have been
brought," a citizen defendant may seek transfer to the district of his residence;
but an alien defendant may never seek transfer to any district other than the dis-
trict of defendant's residence or the district where the claim arose. 25 Afortiori,
since a suit against an alien "might have been brought" in any district, it may be
transferred to any district. 26
It is the thesis of this comment that such discrimination against aliens, at least
so far as it concerns individual permanent resident aliens, is not only in viola-
tion of the principles of international law and treaty obligations of the United
States, but is also inconsistent with the constitutional policy of affording equal
justice under law to all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
1. REASONS BEHIND § 139 1(d)
Section 1391(d), which applies equally to alien individuals and alien corpora-
tions, was enacted to give "statutory recognition to the weight of authority con-
cerning a rule of venue as to which there had been a sharp conflict of decisions." 2
According to the weight of authority referred to above, aliens were not within
the scope of either the general venue statute or the special venue statute concern-
ing patent infringement suits. 28 At issue in the conflicting decisions was whether
the provisions of the special venue statute for patent infringement suits were
exclusive of the general venue statute. 29
Prior to 1893, patent infringement suits were generally regarded as subject to
the general venue statute.30 But in 1893, the Court announced that the general
venue statute was intended to apply only to that part of the federal jurisdiction
which was concurrent with state court jurisdiction, and was not intended to
22. 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1948).
23. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 186 (3rd ed. 1976).
24. Id.
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d). § 1404(a).
26. Keating v. Penn. Co., 245 F. 155, 160-61 (6th Cir. 1917).
27. Reviser's Note, Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1948).
28. Sandusky Foundry & Machine Co. v. DeLavand, 251 F. 631, 632 (6th Cir. 1918); Keating v.
Pennsylvania Co., 245 F. 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1917).
29. Sandusky Foundry & Machine Co. v. DeLavand, 251 F. 631 (6th Cir. 1918); Stonite Co. v.
Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
30. Chafee v. Hayward, 20 How. 208, 215-16 (1858).
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apply to patent suits which were entrusted exclusively to the federal courts.31 The
apparent effect of that decision was that all patent infringement suits, against
both citizens and aliens, could be brought in any district. 32 This generated great
confusion in the lower Courts. Congress then responded by enacting a new
special venue statute 33 which permitted patent infringement claims "to be heard
only in the district where the defendant was an inhabitant, or in the district where
the defendant committed acts of infringement andalso maintained a regular and
established place of business. '34 Thus the Congress put such cases "in a class by
themselves, outside the scope of general venue legislation." 35
The new special venue statute generated new problems concerning patent
infringement suits against aliens. The Supreme Court had determined that venue
of patent infringement suits was exclusively governed by the special venue
statute for such actions, independent of the general venue statute.36 This holding
permitted the construction that alien corporations were not inhabitants of the
United States, did not have a regular and established place of business in the
United States, and could not be sued in any federal district court. 37 Also, since
jurisdiction of patent infringement suits was entrusted exclusively to federal
courts, 3 such alien corporations conceivably could assert that such units could
not be brought against them even in the state courts. Such a construction of the
special venue statute in patent infringement suits would prohibit citizens from
suing aliens anywhere in the United States, but allow aliens to sue citizens,
subject only to the restrictions of the venue provision. In order to resolve this
new problem, the courts, relying on the old presumption of the nonresidence of
aliens, held that an alien was not within the scope of the venue statutes, 39 and
therefore he could be sued anywhere in the United States. Thus, alien
corporations were subject to the jurisdiction of the United States courts.
This rule may be justified by the underlying policy considerations that an alien
corporation could otherwise "flood this country with merchandise known by it
to infringe and escape responsibility merely because it did not maintain a regular
business here."'40 Since alien corporations prefer to conduct their business in the
United States through agents, they neither reside nor maintain a regular and
established place of business in any federal district. 4' But the statutory
31. In Re Hehorst, 150 U.S. 653, 661-62; See also, Stonite Co.
v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
32. Supra note 18, at 712.
33. 29 Stat. 695 (1897) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1948)).
34. Supra note 18, at 712 (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. Stonite Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 567 (1942). See also' Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228, (1957); Brunette Machine Works Ltd. v. Kockum Ind.
Inc., 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
37. See United Shoe Machine Co. v. Duplessis Co., 133 F. 930 (1st Cir. 1904).
38. See Stonite Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942).
39. See United Shoe Machine Co. v. Duplessis Co., 133 F. 930 (Ist Cir. 1904); Wind River Lum-
ber Co. v. Frankfurt Marine, Accident and Plate Glass Ins. Co., 196 F. 340 (9th Cir. 1912).
40. Chas. Pfizer & Co. v. Laboratori Pro-Ter Prodotti Therapeutici, 278 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
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recognition of the rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d), did not limit its applicability to
such corporations. The statute is equally applicable to individual aliens who are
in the United States temporarily, individual aliens Who are in the United States
with a view to becoming citizens, and political refugees who have severed all
connections with their country of origin. These individuals share equally with
citizens in the resources of the country, contribue to the economic welfare of the
states in which they live, and may be called to serve in the armed forces of the
United States.4 2 They are subject to the burdens and have a right to enjoy the
benefits of residence in the United States. An alien corporation may acquire
citizenship simply by incorporating in the United States.4 3 An individual alien
however, may not apply for citizenship until he or she has resided in the United
States for at least five years.44 Whereas it may justifiably be said that an alien
corporation is not a resident of any district, and therefore does not come within
the scope of the language of the venue statute, the same reasons do not hold true
in applying the rule to individuals.
II. SECTION 1391 (d) UNDER INTERNATIONAL STANDARD OF JUSTICE
The ancient method of marque and reprisal45 allowed aliens to seek redress of
their grievances in foreign territories by force. The Law of Nations, which
superceded marque and reprisal, was based principally on the assumption that
"justice will be as impartially administered to aliens as it is to the subjects of that
Prince, in whose court the matter is being tried. '46 The United States itself has
sought protection under this principle of equality. When the North American
colonies achieved their independence from Great Britain they faced a hostile
European commercial practice which discriminated against American traders in
European ports by collecting more imposts from American ships than European
ships. 47 The colonies then signed treaties with the foreign nations guaranteeing
equal treatment to aliens and citizens, particularly in the matters of commerce
and navigation. 48
Beginning with the American treaty with Belgium and Sicily in 1848,
protection of person and property of aliens was specifically mentioned in the
treaties, and that protection was provided in comity with nationals. Typical of
such treaties was the treaty with Italy in 1871 which provided: "The citizens of
each of the high contracting parties shall receive in the states and territories of
the other the most constant protection and security for their person and property
and shall enjoy in this respect the same rights and privileges as are or shall be
41. Id.
42. See notes 85 through 92 infra.
43. See Princeton Min. Co. v. Butte First National Bank, 7 Mont. 530, 19 P. 210(1888); Kathleen
Citrus Land Co. v. City of Lakeland, 124 Fla. 659, 169 So. 356 (1936).
44. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (a).
45. SOHN &. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 23-25 (1973).
46. E. SOTAN, The Silesian Loan and Fredrick the Great, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 26 (Sohn & Buergenthal ed. 1973).
47. GIBSON, ALIEN AND THE LAW 20 (1940).
48. Id. at 2 1.
5
Hyder: Aliens under the Federal Venue Statute
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1978
ALIENS UNDER FEDERAL VENUE STA TUTE
granted to natives."48 More recently, in its treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation treaties with Japan and Germany, the United States is committed to
provide "national treatment" to Japanese and German nationals in their access
to the judicial -tribunals of the United States. 50 "National treatment" is defined
in the treaties as "treatment accorded within the territories of a Party upon terms
no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein in like situations to
national companies, products, vessels and other objects, as the case may be, of
such Party."5'
In addition to its treaty obligations, by committing itself to uphold the
international standard of human justice in several international declarations on
human rights, the United States is obligated to assure that "[e]very person may
resort to the courts to insure respect for his legal rights, '52 that "[e]veryone is
entitled to full equality to a full and fair public hearing, by an independent and
impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights and obligations," 53 and that
"all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal
protection of the laws. '54
By denying aliens equal access to the judicial tribunals, the federal venue
statute significantly compromises the effectiveness of the international
guarantees of the United States. It has been stated:
The right to protection of person and property carries with it the right
to equal treatment in tribunals charged with its protection. Moreover it
is a violation of international law if a state, in peace time, refuses or
limits juristic protection of aliens either in its courts or at the hands of its
administrative officers. In the matters of administration and judicial
procedure, nationals of foreign statesare by virtue of international law
assimilated, in principle, to nationals. 55
The effects of the presumption of nonresidence of aliens, for venue purposes, are
not consistent with the United States' commitments 56 to uphold the
international standard of human justice found in several international
declarations on human rights.57
49. Id. at 22.
50. Note, Federal Venue for Aliens: The Presumption of Non-Residencv. 3 CALIF. W. INTER'L
L.J. 417 (1972-73).
51. Id. at 418.
52. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Ch. I Art. XVIII (1948), in BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Sohn & Buergenthal ed. 1973).
53. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1948, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 10,
in BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 73 (Sohn & Buergenthal
ed. 1973).
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1948, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 10, in
BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 73 (Sohn & Buergenthal ed.
1973).
54. Id. Art. 7.
55. Supra note 7, at 18.
56. Supra note 18, at 712.
57. Id.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY OF SECTION 1391(d)
Aliens, as a class, have always enjoyed an important status in the United
States. From its inception, the United States has welcomed and drawn strength
from the immigration of aliens.58 The Declaration of Independence indicates
that one of the causes of the American Revolution was the fact that England had
hindered free immigration into the colonies. 59 As long ago as 1886, the U.S.
Supreme Court brought aliens within the protection of the fourteenth
amendment's directive that a state must not "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection 9 f the laws." 60 However, until a few decades
ago, rights and privileges of aliens were not fully recognized in the United States.
The rule denying protection of venue laws to aliens on which section 1391(d)
stands, acquired prominence in the days when discrimination against aliens was
held to be constitutionally permissible on the slightest pretext of a supposed
state interest. 61
More recently, the Supreme Court significantly expanded the scope of the
guarantees of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to aliens.
The Court concluded:
Classifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or
race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.Aliens
as a class are a prime example of a "discrete and insular minority" (See
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4
(1938)) for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate. 62
This constitutional policy has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court
in its more recent pronouncements, 63 and the Court has consistently emphasized
that a state must justify the use of a suspect classification by showing that "its
purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial and that
its use of the classification is necessary ... to the accomplishment of its purpose
or the safeguard of its interest."6 4
In some of the alienage cases brought under the equal protection clause, the
Supreme Court appears to have adopted a less demanding standard of review
58. In Re Griffith, 413 U.S. 717, 719 (1973).
59. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, Anerica a Land of Irnnigrants, in IMMIGRATION
AS A FACTOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 202 (Handlin ed. 1962).
60. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
61. The Supreme Court validated a state statute denying pool room licenses to aliens, stating: "'it
is enough for present purposes that the ordinance in the light of facts admitted or generally assumed,
does not preclude the possibility of a rational basis for the legislative judgment." Clarke v. Decken-
back 274 U.S. 392, 397 (1927); Validating a state statute which disqualified aliens from taking or
holding interest in land the Court held that the fourteenth amendment protects only "against arbi-
trary and capricious or unjustly descriminatory actions of the state ... but it does not take away
from the state those powers of police that were reserved at the time of the adoption of the Consti-
tution." Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 216-17 (1923).
62. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
63. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1(1977); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); In Re
Griffith, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
64. In Re Griffith, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
7
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than strict scrutiny, examining the nature of the state's interest.65 But the
emphasis is on the nature of the state's interest, and it is not clear whether the
Court is defining the circumstances requiring a less demanding review, or simply
indicating that the nature of the state's interest may be so compelling as to
withstand strict scrutiny.66 In Sugarman v. Dugall, 67 which used strict scrutiny
to invalidate a state statute excluding aliens from competitive civil services, the
Court announced that if the state barred aliens from holding "state elective or
important non-elective, executive, legislative, and judicial positions" in which
persons participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad
public policy, such exclusion would be scrutinized under a standard less
demanding than that normally accorded classifications involving 'discrete and
insular' minorities.6 Recently, the Court used the Sugarman analysis when,
while emphasizing that a "[p]olice officer very clearly falls within the category of
'important non-elective.., officers who participate directly in the.., execution.
. of broad public policy," 69 the Court validated a New York statute excluding
aliens from police jobs, under a less demanding scrutiny generally applied for the
review of states' discretionary functions.7 0 Emphasizing the importance of the
state's interest in protecting the rights of its own citizens to be "governed" by
their citizen peers, the Court held: "The state need only justify its classification
by a showing of some rational relationship between the interest sought to be
protected and the limiting classification."7 Although the case indicates a
significant departure from the "heightened judicial solicitude" considered
appropriate for aliens in the Court's recent decisions,7 2 it has not
indiscriminately withheld strict scrutiny from allalienage classification cases.
Rather, the Court has chosen to vary the standard of review depending upon the
nature of the state's interest.
Although the concept of equal justice under the law found in both the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the due process clause of the
fifth amendment require the same type of analysis, some overriding national
interest may justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for
an individual state.7 3 When a federal law concerns matters of national
importance, it is not subject to the strict judicial scrutiny required in the equal
protection analysis. 74
It is settled that decisions concerning aliens "may implicate our relations with
foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications must be defined in light
of changing political and economic circumstances, such decisions are frequently
65. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); Foley v. Connelie, 430 U.S. 944 (1978).
66. See Foley v. Connelie, 430 U.S. 944 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
68. Id. at 648.
69. Foley v. Connelie, 430 U.S. 944 (1978).
70. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
71. Supra note 69.
72. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
73. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
74. Id.
8
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of a political character." 75 Therefore, under its exclusive constitutional authority
to regulate aliens, 76 Congress is allowed wide discretion in its policy deter-
mination concerning aliens.77 Such need for political discretion however, has
not convinced the Court to abdicate its review of congressional decisions
concerning aliens under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Recently, in Fiallo v. Bell,7 8 the Supreme Court announced the standard of
review required of congressional decisions concerning aliens. In that case, the
petitioner had challenged the constitutional validity of section 101 (b) (1) (D) and
101(b)(2) of the Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, which exclude the
relationship between an illegitimate child and his natural father (as opposed to
his natural mother) from the special preference immigration status accorded by
the Act to the child or parent of a United States citizen or permanent resident
alien. The Court recognized that the need for political discretion in congression-
al decisions concerning aliens allows only a limited review under the due
process of the fifth amendment. 79 But the Court expressly rejected the
government's claim of unreviewable discretion and stated: "Our cases reflect
acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even with
respect to [the] power of Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of
aliens. o80 Such limited judicial responsibility was announced by the Court in
Kleindienst v. Mandel.8 1 In that case, the Attorney General had authority under
the law to waive the statutory prohibition of visas to aliens who advocate the
economic, international and governmental doctrines of world communism.8 2
Upon denial of such waiver to Mandel, he and other citizens of the United States
who claimed that their first amendment right to hear Mandel in person was
abridged by the denial, sued. The Court rejected the Government's contention
that it had "unfettered discretion, and any reason or no reason (for denying a
waiver) may be given," and upheld the denial only after finding that it was based
on a "legitimate and bona fide" reason-Mandel's abuse of the visa privileges on
a prior occasion.8 3
The presumption that aliens do not reside anywhere in the United States,
which is the basis of section 139 1(d),8 4 cannot bejustified even under this limited
review. No legitimate distinction between citizens and aliens exists which will
justify the receipt by citizens of benefits from the venue provision which are not
accorded to aliens. By statutory definition, "[i]mmigrant aliens are those seeking
to enter the United States for permanent residence with a view of becoming
citizens. 8 5 Aliens pay taxes as do bona fide citizens, and are subject to call into
75. Mathew v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976).
76. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69-70 (1941).
77. Supra note 47.
78. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
79. Id. at 796.
80. Id. at 796 n. 5.
81. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
82. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (28) (1952).
83. Supra note 54, at 769.
84. Supra note 27.
9
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the armed forces.8 6 They live and establish their residence in various states and
engage in different occupations just as citizens do. They contribute to the
economic growth of the state in which they live.87 They share equally with
citizens in welfare assistance, 88 state financial assistance for education, 89 and
may demand from states full assurance that the laws of the land will be applied to
them on the same basis as they are applied to citizens.9" They have a right to be
employed in civil service jobs,9 1 and to be admitted to the bars of several states.92
If permanent resident aliens are entitled to the benefits and protections of all
state laws equally with citizens, there is no legitimate basis for distinguishing
between a resident-citizen and a resident-alien merely for purposes of venue laws
which operate on the basis of a person's residence in a state and are meant to save
the defendant from inconvenience if he is compelled to answer suits wherever
found. There is no bona fide reason to justify subjecting aliens to the possibility
of answering suits in remote areas of the country. It only encourages harassing
suits by citizens against aliens and handicaps aliens in conducting an effective
defense. By compelling aliens to sue a citizen in the district of the citizen's
residence, while allowing citizens to sue an alien wherever he may be found,
even temporarily, the venue provision weakens the aliens' litigating strength and
denies him the opportunity of an equally effective defense. The Supreme Court
stated long ago that an alien's liability to be sued brings with it the right to use all
means to defend: "The liability and the right of defense are inseparable. A
different result would be a blot on our jurisprudence and civilization. It will be
contrary to the first principle of the social compact, and of the right
administration of justice." 93
CONCLUSION
Despite its inconsistency with the United States' constitutional policy and
international commitments, the federal venue statute, which is based upon the
presumption of the nonresidence of aliens, has withstood challenges throughout
the history of the United States. The presumption arose in the days when the
constitutional right of aliens to enjoy the fruits of their residence in the United
States equally with other citizens was not fully recognized. Today however, this
presumption of nonresidence is clearly inconsistent with the United States
constitutional policy to afford equal protection of laws to all, and its recent
assertion of leadership in the field of human rights. It is time that the Congress
reexamine the policy behind this presumption and recognize the status of
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (5), 1181, 1184 (1952).
86. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367 (1971).
87. Id.
88. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
89. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
90. Mohamed v. Park, 352 F. Supp. 518 (D. Mass. 1973).
91. Suragman v. Dougall.413 U.S. 634 (1973).
92. In Re Griffith, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Examining Board v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572(1976).
93. Nierbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
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residence for venue purposes, at least for aliens who are permanent residents of
the United States by law and who reside in the United States.
Nonresident aliens temporarily in the United States may not assert their rights
in equality with permanent resident aliens. An effectuation of the policy of pro-
viding equal justice to all will not be completed by excluding them from the
harassment of defending suits anywhere in the country, specially since it does
not serve any legitimate national purpose. However, the policy behind the
present statute may fairly be justified as to alien corporations conducting their
business in the United States through agents. Clearly, the policy is notjustifiable
as to those alien corporations that have an established place of business in this
country.
The Congress should extend recognition of residence to an alien in the district
where, in the case of an individual, he or she has established legal residence, and
in the instance of an alien corporation, it has established a place of business
according to the law of the state. Such recognition will not require any
significant overhaul of either the general venue statute (28 U.S.C. § 1391) or the
special venue statute for patent infringement suits (28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) ), because
the general venue statute is clearly based upon residence, and an examination of
the cases holding section 1400(b) inapplicable to aliens reveals that the result
would have been otherwise in the absence of the presumption of nonresidence of
aliens. The task may be effectively accomplished by deleting the language of
section 1391 (d) and substituting instead a provision recognizing the residence of
an alien in the district of his or her legal residence.
SYED I. HYDER
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